This paper studies optimal Public Private Partnerships contract between a public entity and a consortium, in continuous-time and with a continuous payment, with the possibility for the public to stop the contract. The public ("she") pays a continuous rent to the consortium ("he"), while the latter gives a best response characterized by his effort. This effect impacts the drift of the social welfare, until a terminal date decided by the public when she stops the contract and gives compensation to the consortium. Usually, the public can not observe the effort done by the consortium, leading to a principal agent's problem with moral hazard. We solve this optimal stochastic control with optimal stopping problem in this context of moral hazard. The public value function is characterized by the solution of an associated Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Variational Inequality. The public value function and the optimal effort and rent processes are computed numerically by using the Howard algorithm. In particular, the impact of the social welfare's volatility on the optimal contract is studied.
Introduction
Public-private partnership (PPP) is defined as a long-term contract between a private party and a public entity, for the construction and/or the management of an asset or public service, in which the consortium takes the risks and a great responsibility to manage the project. Typically, the consortium is making an effort to improve the social value of the project in exchange to a rent payed by the public. The objective of PPP contracts is to ensure a better quality-price ratio in the use of public funds. But a major problem of this type of contracts is the asymmetry of information between the two parties, both in the negotiation and monitoring phases of the project. In particular, the public can usually not observe the effort done by the consortium. It is a principal agent's problem with moral hazard. Numerous situations in the economic literature lead to principal agent's formulation. For example in Biais et al. [3] , respectively in Pagès and Possamai [16] , the unobservable effort of the agent reduces the intensity of a Poisson process describing the arrival of large losses, or respectively the default time of a pool of long term loans.
The first paper on principal agent problems in continuous-time is the paper of Holmstrom and Milgrom [12] . They considered a Brownian setting in which the agent controls the drift of the output process, and receives a lumpsum payment at the end of the contract, that is a finite time horizon. In their setting, the agent is risk averse and the principal is risk-neutral with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion. Williams [22] and Cvitanic and Zhang [7] extended those results to more general utility functions. In those situations, the optimal contract (characterized by the lumpsum payment) is a linear function of the output process terminal value. A general theory, using coupled systems of Forward Backward Stochastic Differential Equations, is developped in the monograph of Cvitanic and Zhang [8] . Still in a framework of a lumpsum payment on a finite horizon, Cvitanic et al. [5, 6] considered a general formulation in which the agents efforts impact both the drift and the volatility of the output process, using second-order BSDE in a non Markovian stochastic control setting.
Nevertheless, due to the long maturity of PPP contracts (around 30 to 50 years), it seems unreasonable to propose to the consortium a unique payment at the maturity of the contract. For example, Hajjej et al. [11] derived the optimal perpetual contract (characterized by a rent) using techniques of stochastic control under partial information. This paper proposes a similar modeling with a continuous payment in random horizon, but adding the possibility of stopping the contract at a fixed or a random time, decided by the public. This combines optimal stochastic control and optimal stopping in this context of moral hazard. The seminal paper of Sannikov [19] proposed a tractable model, in a continuous-time setting and with continuous payment, to study the optimal contract and the optimal time of retiring/firing the agent. The optimal contract is written as a function of the agent's continuation value, which appears as the state variable of the problem. Anderson et al. [1] studied the optimal replacement time (either for the sake of incentive provision, or for the sake of growth) of managers operating for a long-lived firm. Décamps and Villeneuve [10] studied the optimal strategic liquidation time, in a framework where the firm's profitability is impacted by the unobservable managerial effort of the agent. In this setting the principal's problem appears to be a 2-dimensional fully degenerated Markov control problem and the optimal contract that implements full effort is derived. Both papers [1] and [10] assume the agents and the principal to be risk neutral.
In this paper, we consider a contract between a public entity and a consortium, in a continuous-time setting. The consortium is making effort to improve the social value of the project, driven by a one-dimensional Brownian motion. The effort is not observable by the public, that must choose a continuous rent she will pay to the agent in compensation to his effort. We assume that the effort only affects the drift and not the volatility of the social value. Indeed in a one-dimensional setting, controlling the volatility would imply that the effort is observable, through the quadratic variation of the social value. We also assume that the volatility of the social value is known, contrary to the paper of Mastrolia and Possamai [15] in which the agent and the principal faced both uncertainty on the volatility of the output. Our aim is to study qualitatively the impact of the volatility parameter on the optimal contract. Since PPP are contracts covering decades, our model tackles the possibility for the public to stop the contract at a fixed or a random date. The public pays a rent to the consortium, while the latter gives a best response characterized by his effort until an terminal date decided by the public when she stops the contract and gives compensation to the consortium. We assume that the consortium will accept the contract only if his expected payoff exceeds his reservation value x. As in Sannikov [19] , we assume that the agent is risk averse and that the principal is risk-neutral. We consider a Stackelberg leadership model between the public and the consortium, that can be solved in two steps. First, given a fixed contract, the public computes the best effort of the consortium. Then, the public solves her problem by taking into account the best effort of the consortium and computes the associated optimal contract. As it is standard in the literature, we use the weak approach, that is the agent changes the distribution of the social value of the project, by making the probability measure depend on agent's effort. Finally we characterize optimal contracts and we provide numerical solutions using Howard algorithm. The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the problem, using the weak approach and we describe the public and the consortium problems. In Section 3, we determine the incentive compatible contract and we provide the dynamics of the consortium objective function, using the BSDE technique. In Section 4, we derive the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Variational Inequality associated to the public value function and we provide a verification theorem. Section 5 is devoted mainly to the numerical study of the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Variational Inequality based on the Howard algorithm. Technical result on BSDE with random horizon and the details of Howard's algorithm are postponed in Appendix.
The Public Private Partnership model under moral hazard
In this section, we work under the weak formulation as it is done usually in the principal-agent literature. Let W be a standard one dimensional Brownian motion defined on a probability space (Ω, P), and F = (F t ) t≥0 is the filtration generated by W ('satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness). We introduce the social value of the project that is observed by the public
where • X 0 > 0 is the initial value of the project.
• σ > 0 is the volatility of the operational cost of the infrastructure maintenance, that is assumed to be constant.
Remark 2.1
We could take σ equal to 1 in (2.1). If σ ≡ 1, then X is the canonical process defined on Ω the set of continuous paths starting from X 0 and P is the Wiener measure on Ω.
In this paper, σ ≡ 1 (the unit of time being the year) and we study numerically the sensitivity of the value function, the optimal effort and the optimal rent to the volatility parameter σ.
In the weak formulation, the agent changes the distribution of the process X, by making the underlying probability measure P A depend on agent's effort A. We define the process
where ϕ will be specified hereafter. We denote by T the set of all finite F-stopping times and we consider A := {(A s ) s≥0 F-progressively measurable process, A s ≥ 0 ds ⊗ dP a.e. such that (γ A t ) t is a P martingale and sup τ ∈T
The probability measure P A is defined by dP A dP | Ft = γ A t for all t ≥ 0. Then, P A and P are equivalent, by Girsanov's Theorem, the process (W A t ) t≥0 defined by
is a P A -Brownian motion and the social value of the project is given by: [20] ). In our case, ϕ is assumed to be bounded (see Assumption 2.4) but the horizon is only finite.
The public observes the social value X of the project, but she does not observe directly the effort of the consortium: this a situation of moral hazard. She chooses the rent she will pay to the consortium to compensate him for his efforts and the operational costs that he supports. The public could end the contract at the date τ , where τ is a stopping time in T . A contract is a triplet Γ = ((R t ) t , τ, ξ) where R is a non-negative F-progressively measurable process, τ ∈ T , and ξ is a non negative F τ -mesurable random variable which represents the cost of stopping the contract. Remark 2.3 Contrary to a strong formulation (cf. Hajjej et al. [11] ), the filtrations F X and F coincide in the weak formulation, where F X is the filtration generated by the social value process X and F is the Brownian filtration generated by the standard Brownian motion W .
We now define the respective optimization problems for the consortium and the public. Let us first define the functions involved in the formulation of the optimization problems:
• ϕ is the function that models the marginal impact of the consortium's efforts on the social value, ϕ is C 2 strictly concave, bounded, increasing, ϕ > 0 and • h is the cost of the effort for the consortium; h is C 2 , strictly convex increasing, h(0) = 0.
• The time preference parameter λ of the consortium is greater than δ the one of the public (λ ≥ δ): the consortium is more impatient than the public.
We assume that given a contract Γ = ((R s ) s , τ, ξ) offered by the principal, the consortium gives a best response in terms of an effort process A: this is a Stackelberg leadership model. The consortium accepts the contract only if his expected payoff exceeds his reservation value x.
Agent's best response
if it exists (see Lemma 3.4 for the proof of the existence), where
The objective function starting at time t for the consortium is P A -a.s.
As the process (J C t (Γ, A)) 0≤t≤τ , is continuous and P A ∼ P, we have
Given the best response of the agent the principal problem is formulated by
subject to the reservation constraint
5)
and
The objective function starting at time t for the public is P A * -a.s.
Using the same arguments as in (2.3), we have
Incentive compatible contracts
The aim of this section is to determine the incentive compatible contracts and to provide the dynamics of the consortium objective function J C . To achieve this, one first needs to prove an existence and uniqueness result for a certain type of BSDE with random horizon. As we will see later, the objective function for the agent is related to the solution of the following BSDE with a random time horizon τ
where the generator g : R + × Ω × R → R does not depend on Y (it will be specified hereafter). BSDEs with random horizon have been studied by some authors. Chen [4] considered a random horizon which could be infinite and assumed that the constant of Lipschitz of the generator is time-dependent and square integrable on [0, ∞]: this assumption is not satisfied in our case, since the Lipschitz coefficient is constant. Darling and Pardoux [9] studied a BSDE with random horizon. They assumed that the generator depends on (y, z). Applying their results in our context would force us to assume strong integrability assumptions on the terminal condition ζ,
Recently, Lin et al. [14] weakened this assumption. They assumed that E[|e ρτ ζ| 2 ] < ∞, for a ρ > 0 in our setting, which remains stronger than the condition E[|ζ| 2 ] < ∞. That is why we need to prove another existence result adapted to our situation. To do this, we assume that:
(H1) g(., ., z) is a progressively measurable process in R for each z ∈ R and
(H2) g satisfies the following contraction condition, i.e. there exist a constant 0 ≤ c < 1 such that for any s, w, z 1 and z 2
We introduce the following spaces for a fixed stopping time τ ∈ T :
The existence and uniqueness of a solution to the BSDE (3.1) is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Let τ be a stopping time in T , ζ ∈ L 2 (F τ ) and let g satisfy (H1) and (H2), then:
is the solution of the BSDE (τ, ζ, g) (resp. BSDE (τ, ζ, g )) with generators satisfying (H1) and (H2), and g(t, w,
The proof is postponed in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.1 is used to determine the incentive compatible contract and to provide the dynamics of the consortium objective function. This will be particularly useful in what follows to reformulate the optimization problems in terms of the consortium objective function J C (instead of X). 
Proof: For any admissible contract Γ ∈ A P , for any A ∈ A C and for any t ∈ [[0, τ [[, we define the integrable process
where the last equality is obtained using Bayes formula.
As
ds + e −λτ ξ)|F t is a (P, F)-martingale, by the martingale representation theorem, there exists a F-progressively measurable process χ such that: 1
Then denoting Z A s = e λs ( χs
and we obtain
The associated Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE (R, τ, ξ) in short) is given by
Considering the discounted quantities
It is important to work under the probability measure P and not P A . Indeed, although the inclusion
the reverse inclusion is not true in general case (see the Tsirel'son's example in [23] ).
The generator of the BSDE (3.5) depends only onZ A and is defined by g(t, r, z) := −Ũ (r) − ψ(a, z). g : R + × Ω × R → R satisfies (H1) (since ϕ is bounded and refering to the definition of the set A C ) and (H2) (g satisfies the contraction condition with constant c = ϕ ∞ σ < 1). Then from Proposition 3.1, there exists a unique (Ỹ ,Z A ) ∈ S 2 (τ ) × H 2 (τ ) solving the BSDE (3.5). Therefore, there exists a unique (Y, Z A ) solving the BSDE (3.4) such that
From the definition of A * , we havẽ
By the comparison theorem (see Proposition 3.1), we have
• Lemma 3.3 For any Γ ∈ A P and A * the best response (if it exists), we have
Proof: Let Γ ∈ A P and A * the best response. We fix ε > 0 and ω ∈ Ω. By definition of J C (Γ, A * ), there exists A ε,ω ∈ A C , which is an ε-optimal control for J C τ (Γ, A * ), for all τ stopping time, τ ≥ τ , a.s, i.e.
By definition of J C 0 , from the comparison theorem (see Proposition 3.1), we have for any A ∈ A C
We fix A ∈ A C and we define the process
We can show by the measurable selection theorem (see. Chapter 7 in Bertsekas and Shreve [2] ) that the process A is progressively measurable. By using again the law of iterated conditional expectation, Bayes formula and from (3.8), we get
Let ε go to 0, we obtain the inequality:
We consider then the set 
The function ψ is stritly concave, the first-order necessary condition of optimality ∂ψ ∂a (A * (z), z) = 0 is sufficient and is equivalent to
ϕ (0) : then Equation (3.10) is not well defined. The optimum could not be positive. In the neighborhood of 0, the function ψ must be decreasing, otherwise A * (z) = 0 is not a maximum. The necessary condition of optimality ∂ψ ∂a (0, z) = −h (0) + z ϕ (0) σ ≤ 0 is satisfied in 0. As the function ψ is strictly concave, the latter condition is sufficient. This shows that A * (z) = 0 Third case: z ≤ 0: The function ψ(z, .) is decreasing in a and so A * (z) = 0. In particular, A(0) = 0, and so Lemma 3.4 is proved.
•
It is important to study conditions under which a bijection between (A * t ) t≥0 and (Z A t ) t≥0 holds.
Proposition 3.5 Let Γ ∈ A P and A ∈ A C . There exists a bijection between the process (Z A t ) t≥0 and the optimal effort (A * t ) t≥0 , the bijection is given by
. As h and ϕ are increasing (see Assumption 2.4), (Z A t ) t≥0 is a positive process. The function h ϕ being invertible gives a bijection between Z A t and A * t . Now we consider D C := {(t, ω), A * t (ω) = 0}. On this set, from Lemma 3.4, we have Z A t ≤ σ h (0) ϕ (0) . By Lemma 3.3, we have U (R t ) ≥ h(0) = 0 which implies that R t ≥ U −1 (0) = 0. From the definition of the objective function for the public, R * t = 0 on D C . For (t, ω) ∈ D C , the consortium does not give any effort and does not receive any rent from the public and we have
The uniqueness of the BSDE's solution implies Z
In Sannikov [19] Z A is assumed to be bounded below by γ 0 = U (C) where C is the upper bound of the rent. In our case, the lower bound for Z A is zero. This is coherent with Sannikov [19] , since in our case C = ∞ and U (∞) = 0.
Proposition 3.7 Suppose Assumption 2.4. The dynamics of J C for any incentive compatible contract (Γ, A * (Z)) is given by the BSDE with random terminal condition
where A * (Z) is defined in Lemma 3.4.
Remark 3. 8 We will rather write Equation (3.11) in the integral form
Proof: We fix Γ ∈ A p . For any A ∈ A C , we have
Applying the martingale representation theorem to (J C t (Γ, A * (Z A )) t≥0 as in Lemma 3.2, there exists a progressively measurable process (Z
From the uniqueness of the solution of the last BSDE, we have
This allows to omit the dependence of A in Z A . Inequality (3.7) implies that
•
We now reformulate the stochastic control problem with J C as state variable and the contract Γ and the best effort A * (Z) as control processes. Usually in the literature (see Sannikov [19] and Cvitanic et al. [6] ), the optimization problem consists in maximizing a certain criterion where the control variables are given by Γ and (Z t ) t≥0 which is a standard mixed stoppingregular stochastic control problem. In this paper, we keep the explicit control (A * (Z t )) t≥0 instead of (Z t ) t≥0 , since (A * (Z t )) t≥0 represents a physical quantity and thus it is more quantifiable and interpretable than the control (Z t ) t≥0 which is a diffusion coefficient.
Hamilton Jacobi Bellman variational inequality
From now on, we adopt a forward point of view for the dynamics of the consortium objective function which evolves according to the following forward SDE
Using the characterization of the incentive compatible contracts, the optimization problem of the public can be written as a standard stochastic control problem. The state process is the consortium objective function J C whose dynamics is given by (4.1) . The control processes are given by R, τ and A * (Z) ∈ A C , and the value function given by (2.4) is formulated as:
is the conditional expectation with respect to the initial event {J C 0 (x, R, τ, A * (Z)) = x} and Y := (R, τ, A * (Z)) R ≥ 0 F-progressively measurable process such that
The set S := {x ≥ 0 : v(x) ≤ −x} is called the stopping region and is of particular interest: whenever the state is in this region, it is optimal to stop the contract immediately. Its complement S c is called the continuation region. We apply the dynamic programming principle, which takes the following form: for all stopping time η ∈ T , we have v(x) = sup 4) which is used to derive the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Variational Inequality (HJBVI) associated to the value function where the second order differential operator L a,r is defined by
The first step consists in giving the boundary condition. Proof:
The boundary condition
The proof is divided into two steps.
Step 1: We prove that
For fixed n ∈ N, we consider the controls (R, n, A * (Z)) ∈ Y, where Y is defined by (4.3). We define
We have v(0) ≥ V (0) since the value function V maximizes the same criteria as v, but on a smaller set. By (4.2), v(0) ≥ 0, so, we have v(0) ≥ max( V (0), 0).
It remains to show that
Since the public is the leader, she could propose a rentR 0 to the consortium, whereR 0 realizes the maximum on R + of the function r → ϕ • h −1 • U (r) − r.
We have to prove thatĀ 0 := h −1 • U (R 0 ) maximizes the consortium objective function, conditionally on the event {J C 0 (Γ, A * (Z)) = 0}, where Γ = (R 0 , n): Consequently,Ā 0 is the consortium best response to the contract (R 0 , n). From the definition ofR 0
Sending n to infinity, we get
which proves (4.7).
Step 2. To prove the converse inequality, we introduce b ϕ,h,U := sup is the conditional expectation with respect to the event {J C 0 (0, R, τ, A * (Z)) = 0}. We have
(4.9)
On the one hand, by Lemma 3.3,
by definition of b ϕ,h,U . Plugging the last inequality into (4.9), we obtain
On the other hand, we have −J C τ (0, R, τ, A * (Z)) ≤ 0 it yields that
This proves (4.6). •
Verification theorem
In order to provide the verification theorem, a first lemma shows that the public value function satisfies a linear growth condition. 
Proof:
We fix x ≥ 0 and x ≥ 0. From (4.2), we have
where the last inequality is obtained thanks to the linear dependence in x of (e −λτ J C τ (x, R, τ, A * (Z))) (see (4.1) ). The result is proved since v(0) is finite.
• Theorem 4.3 (Verification theorem) Let w ∈ C 2 (R + ) satisfying a linear growth condition, and we assume that
Taking the expectation
where the inequality is obtained by using the assumption δw(x) ≥ sup a,r {L a,r w(x) + ϕ(a) − r} and the last equality is obtained by using the Bayes formula. We fix p > 1, q 1 > 1 and let q 2 the conjugate of q 1 . We have
By using the definition of the set A and the integrability conditions on A C and A P ,
This implies the convergence in L 1 (P) (see Theorem A.1.2 in [17] ) and we may pass to the limit as n → ∞,
As w satisfies a linear growth condition, we have
K is a generic constant which could change from line to line. By using (4.12) and the integrability conditions on A, we have
Then, we may pass to the limit as n → ∞ and
By (4.14) and (4.15), we have
By taking the supremum, we obtain
(ii)-a. We now consider the feedback control (r * ( J C ), τ * , a * ( J C )) which is assumed to be in Y.
We denote Similarly to (i), we show that ( τn 0 e −δs γ a * ( J C ) s (ϕ(a * ( J C s )) − r * ( J C s ))ds) n and γ a * ( J C ) τn w( J C τn ) n are uniformly integrable under P. Passing to the limit as n → ∞, τ n → τ * a.s, and since w( J C τ * ) = − J C τ * , we obtain
We conclude that w = v and (r * ( J C ), τ * , a * ( J C )) is an optimal feedback control. (ii)-b. For x fixed, we maximize the function
When w (x) ≥ 0, the function f (x, .) is non-increasing and the optimum is achieved for r = 0.
Otherwise, the function f (x, .) is concave and the optimal rent is given by r * (x) = arg max r (f (x, r)). Therefore
Furthermore, x → r * (x) is continuous even at zero points of the function w because (U ) −1 (∞) = 0. • Remark 4.4 If we assume that the controls are in a bounded domain, then the value function v is continuously differentiable on (0, ∞[. This follows from Theorem 4 in [21] , since the controls are bounded, the uniform ellipticity condition is satisfied and the coefficients of the HJBVI (4.5) are regular and Lipschitz.
Numerical study
We approximate numerically the solution of the HJBVI (4.5) by using a policy iteration algorithm named Howard algorithm. The numerical approximation of the solution of (4.5) consists in three steps:
1. Reduction to a bounded domain. We have to replace [0, ∞) by a bounded domain [0, x].
Since the behavior of the HJB solution at ∞ is known, v(x) = −x for x large enough, we propose this relevant artificial boundary condition. The choice of the boundary x is empirical and the robustness is studied by varying x.
2. We use finite difference approximations to discretize the variational inequality (4.5).
3. We use Howard algorithm (see Howard [13] ) to solve the discrete equation. We take x = 10 and we plot the value function, the optimal effort and the optimal rent in the continuation region. According to Figure 1 , it seems that the optimal rent is an increasing convex function of the optimal effort. Sensibility of the results to the parameter σ On Figure 1 the optimal public value function v is increasing with respect to σ: the risk is supported by the consortium. The same behaviour is observed for the optimal effort ( Figure 3 ) and for the optimal rent ( Figure 4 ) in case of x large enough. The consortium is subject to volatility risk. We see that a significant volatility crushes the impact of wealth: in this case, there is more risk for the consortium which must make efforts even if the promised x is large enough. And if x is small, the consortium is not ready to provide more effort (compared to a lower volatility). According to Figure 2 , the continuation region depends on volatility: the higher the volatility, the greater the continuation Table 1 : Continuation region for different values of σ.
The following Figure 5 represents the function value on [0,x], for σ = 1.2 : the continuation region is [0, 3.66] on which the value function is convex, it is then equal to minus the identity function on the stopping region [3.66,x]. The last inequality is finite, since Y ∈ S 2 (τ ) and Z ∈ H 2 (τ ). By taking the expectation of (6.3), we have E e θt (∆Y + t ) 2 + E 
where the second inequality is obtained by using the contraction condition and (g(s, ω, Z s ) − g (s, ω, Z s )) ≤ 0. And the last inequality is obtained by using 2ab ≤ a 2 1+ε + (1 + ε)b 2 . Plugging (6.5) into (6.4) and by choosing ε > 0 and θ > c 2 (1 + ε), we obtain E e θt (∆Y + t ) 2 ≤ 0. 
Numerical algorithm
Finite difference approximations Let ∆ be the finite difference step on the state coordinate and x ∆ = (x i ) i=1,N , x i = i∆, be the points of the grid Ω ∆ . The HJBVI (4.5) is discretized by replacing the first and second derivatives of v with the following approximations The system of (N − 1) inequalities (6.6) can be solved by Howard's algorithm. We describe below this algorithm.
The Howard algorithm To solve equation (6.6), we use Howard's algorithm. It consists in computing iteratively two sequences ((a n (x i ), r n (x i )) i=1,...N −1 ) n≥1 and ((v ∆,n (x i )) i=1,...N −1 ) n≥1 (starting from v ∆,1 ) as follows:
Step 2n − 1. v ∆,n is associated a strategy (a n , r n ) ∈ arg min a,r A ∆,(a,r) v ∆,n + B ∆,(a,r) .
• Step 2n. From the strategy (a n , r n ), we compute a partition (D n 1 ∪ D n 2 ) of R + defined by A ∆,(a n ,r n ) v ∆,n + B ∆,(a n ,r n ) ≤ v ∆,n + x ∆ , on D n 1 , A ∆,(a n ,r n ) v ∆,n + B ∆,(a n ,r n ) > v ∆,n + x ∆ , on D n 2 .
The solution v ∆,n+1 is obtained by solving two linear systems A ∆,(a n ,r n ) v ∆,n+1 + B ∆,(a n ,r n ) = 0, on D n 1 ,
and v ∆,n+1 + x ∆ = 0, on D n 2 .
• If |v ∆,n+1 − v ∆,n | ≤ ε, stop, otherwise, go to step 2n + 1.
